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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES ALVIN KENNEDY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 17617

-vL_;\·~REt::::E

'10RRIS, Warden,

Ctch State Prison

Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from the denial of his petition

:x

a writ of habeas corpus, brought in the Third Judicial

D:strict Court,

in and for Salt Lake County,

ccinstine M. Durham, presiding.

the Honorable

Appellant sought post-

c:ir. .'ictio'1 relief from the judgment and sentence imposed upon
r.:;i after being convicted of forcible sexual abuse.
DISPOSITION IX THE LOWER COURT
On February 11, 1981, the district court, after
c:co:.~er1ng
c~· t:·.~

the oral arguments and 1,-ri t ten memoranda subrni tted

r·2s:)ect ive parties, ar.6 after considering the

~: 0 .~2::-i~t of

ti1e trial, denied appellant's petition for a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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writ of habeas corpus.

The court founded its decision 00

~f

ground that appellant was not denied his right to the
effective assistance of counsel and that appellant did not
meet his burden of showing that his waiver of trial by jury
was

involuntary or unknowing (R.

34, 35).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision of the ,
district court denying appellant's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant is inc a rce ra tec1 at the Utah State Prison,
serving two concurrent sentences of zero to five years for
conviction of two counts of forcible sexual abuse, imposed by
the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge presiding in the Fifth
Judicial District Court, Juab County.

The charge 11as based on

petitioner's causing other persons to take indecent liberties
with petitioner's wife with the intent to arouse the
petitioner's sexual desires.
l\ppellant appealed his conviction to this Court,
which affirmed the judgment of the district court in state v.
Kennedy, Utah, 616 P.2d 588 (1980).

-2-
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In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
ot'pellant alleged that he did not knowingly and voluntarily
',:aivE: his

right to be tried by a jury, and that he was denied

his right

to effective assistance of counsel at trial (R.

~-~),

In the instant appeal, appellant alleges only that he

cici not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to trial by

jury.
Greg Warner, of the Utah County Legal Defender's
c1:':'1ce, was appointed to represent appellant in connection
··"·iu th<: charge of forcible sexual abuse (T. 4),
l~,

j_9/S, a Freliminary hearing was held,

On September

resulting in

c.;:,;.ej_lant' s be:..ng bounc over to stand trial in the Fourth
JJc1cial District Court for Juab County.
s2:2ra: pce-trial motions in the matter,
~Jes:~

·~·ith

Mr.

appellant to discuss the motions

tcial strategy on :ive separate occasions (T. 6, 7, 23).

~~1:ionally,
~Jr

including a Motion to

::ir Dismiss and a '•otion to Sever (T. 10, 11).

::sr:ier met personally
c.~.~

Mr. Warner filed

Mr. Wacnec contacted appellant by telephone

2r0us tic,es.
~:ter

condu:ting an investigation of the case, Mr.

::2c"1er formc:lo.ted a basic plan as to how he \'IOuld proceed at
He explained to appellant that appellant did not have
,,

~~s:i::y,

~ .,_·~

that he hac a right to a jury tcial, and that

1·e::-e t.:0

charges against appellant.

Arlditionally, 'lr.

-3-
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Warner felt it would be better to have the matter tried befor,
a judge rather than before a

jury and explained to appellant

that this was a decision that appellant did not have to make
at that time (T.8-10).

Mr. Warner,

in his initial explanatior

to appellant of his right to a jury trial,
he had a right to a

told appellant tho:

jury trial, and that in order for that

right to be waived, appellant would have to decide to waive

1:

and then waive the right on the record at trial (T. 14).
Prior to the filing of the Motion to Sever in
November, 1979, Mr. Warner suggested to appellant that he
waive a jury trial,
would do so.

though he was uncertain whether appellant

Appellant told Mr. warner to go ahead and make

the choice whether to waive the jury, but Mr. Warner responded
that the choice was not his to make and that appellant would
have to agree to the waiver of a jury trial on the

reco~.

Mr. Warner had already told appellant that the role of the
jury was that of a fact finder,
unanimous

that the jury had to be

in its decision to convict him of the charges, and

that the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as
to his guilt.

Appellant told ~lr. warner to use his (\·;arner•s:

best discretion in the matter of the waiver of the jury trial
(T. 11, 12, 14, 15).
on November 21, 1979, Mr. warner appeared before
the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge of the Fourth Judicial
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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oistrict, on the Motion to Sever.
'.·~r. \~arner

t

e

j

io' !

Appellant was not present.

indicated that appellant was willing to waive a

jury trial.

Judge Sorenson indicated that appellant would

have to make such waiver on the record (T. 12, 13).

On November 24, 1979, Mr. Warner had a lengthy
s1scussion with appellant at the Juab County Jail.

i:

t~is

During

discussion, Mr. Warner indicated that a tentative

decision had been reached to have a bench trial.

Mr. Warner

a:so indicatej that i f appellant wished to change his mind,

·:r. i·;arner woJld call Judge Sorenson, have a jury trial set,

o-.c

litigate the Motion to Sever (T. 16).

"" t:J ap_c,ellant,
.~cc
2

~J

Mr. v:arner did not

as alleged by appellant, that he (\varner)

1·.'aivec the jury and that appellant had no chance of having
ry trial ( T . 5 3 ) •
Khile appellant testified at the habeas corpus

'"2ring in the lower court that he had had no discussions with

orner regarding either his right to a jury trial or
""":er o: that right be:ore the Motion to sever was heard on
~979,

1.itf-.

'-':~ss
.:·~r.oer

Mr.

o~':lellant

~arner

testified that he did indeed

::;:e wai.\-er of a jury trial before

21, J.979, as evidenced by the following colloquy at

tearing between

Q:

hi~self

You hearj

~r.

and State's counsel:
Kennedy testify that he never

discussed waiving the jury with you before

-~-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that November 21st hearing.

Do you still der..

that is the case?

A:

Yes, I certainly do.

It would be totally

ridiculous for me to go down the day of trial
and say we are going to waive the jury and
then, you know, have a defendant not go

alon~

with it.
Mr. Kennedy is a very forceful person.

'i

If th-- .

is what he thinks is his best interest,
certainly would not even think, aside from
ethics, just the practicality, would never
indicate to the court that my client was

willing to do that on the record if I had not
conferred regarding that with him prior to
that (T. 52).
The transcript of the proceedings at appellant's trial on
November 27, 1979 shows that appellant waived his right to
trial by jury in open court, and that such waiver was recordec
in the minutes ( T. 18, 19).
In a me;norandum decision on appel2-ant's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus,

the lower court ruled that

appellant was not denied his right to the effective assistancE
of counsel and that appellant did not meet his burden of
showing that his waiver of trial by jury was either
involuntary or unknowing

(R.

34).
-6-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS BECAUSE APPELLANT DID NOT MEET HIS
BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT HIS WAIVER OF A
JURY TRIAL v;As EITHER INVOLUNTARY OR
UNKNOWING.
While it is axiomatic that the right to trial by
jJr:· in crirr,inal cases is a fundamental constitutional right,
:~

is also well established that an accused may waive his

c2r5tituti0nal right to a trial by jury as long as such waiver
__

~l-nta~y

.:::. rs
3:c:e ·:.
Coo'.'
~·;.1

'.:l:

and intelligent.

(1930);

State

'I.

Patton v. United States, 281

Yeck, Utah, 566 P.2d 1248 (1977);

Kelsey, Ctah, 532 P.2d 1001 (1975).
Duncan v.

Louisiana,

In the seminal

391 U.S 145 (1966),

in which the

:e:J States Supreme Court held that the right to a jury

:::101 is a fundamental constitutional right, the Supreme Court
=-~'.'

sta te:J:
would not assert, however, that every
criminal trial--or any particular trial-held before a judge alone is unfair or
that a defendant may never be as fairly
c~eated by a judge as he would be b~ a
p-··
:":ms .ve r.olc no constitutional
~oJots 3b8~t the oractices, common i~
both federal and ~tate courts, of
accepting waivers of jury trial.
39i U.S. at 158.

~e

-7-
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In the landmark case of Adams v. United States ex
rel. Mccann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), the United States Supreme
Court stated:
[A]n accused, in the exercise of a
free and intelligent choice, and with the
considered approval of the court, may
waive trial by jury,
The Patton decision [281 u.s. 276 (1930))
left no room for doubt that a
determination of guilt by a court after
waiver of jury trial could not be set
aside and a new trial ordered except upon
a plain showing that such waiver was not
freely and intelligently made.
If the
result of the adjudicatory process is not
to be set at naught, it is not asking too
much that the burden of showing essential
unfairness be sustained by him who claims
such injustice and seeks to have the
result set aside, and that it be
sustained not as a matter of speculation
but as a demonstrable reality.
Simply
because a result that was insistently
invited, namely, a verdict by a court
without a jury, disappointed the hopes of
the accused, ought not to be sufficient
for rejecting it.
317 U.S. 269, 275 (emphasis added).
States, 325 F.2d 481

See also Dranow v. unitec

(8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 376

u.s.

912 (1964).
Respondent submits that appellant has not sho11n ao
a demonstrable reality that his waiver of jury trial was
involuntary or unknowing.

Thus, he has not sustained his

burden as noted above.

-8-
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The statute concerning waiver of the right to jury
tnal in effect at the time of petitioner's trial was Utah
code Annotated,

§

77-27-2 (1953), as amended, which provided:

Issues of fact must be tried by a
jury, but in all cases except where a
sentence of death may be imposed, trial
by jury may be waived by the defendant.
Such waiver shall be made in open court
and entered in the minutes.
;~.

appellant's case, tt:is statute was complied with since

2~;:ellant

stated on the record in open court that he waived

:.:s rigbt to trial by :ury (T. 18, 19).

Appellant argues, however, that he was
"s.Jstantially and effectively denied his constitutional right
~~

:rial by J'Jry" in tr.at he did not make "an intelligent,

·:~.~ ..-~:-is,

anc '.'Oluntary waiver" thereof (Appellant's brief at

i,

In attempting to substantiate his allegation,

~.:; 1.

2:;:2:1=.nt contends that he was advised by his trial counsel,
i

,I

:'.':"c~cry \i. \·;arner, on :·~ovember 24,

1979, just a few days

c~:)r:e

his trial,

that :.1r. Warner had waived a jury in the

:~>il,

a'.1d that '1r. \·/arner had not previously discussed the
Appellant also asserts that Mr.

2~~e~

gave

b~~

no exp:anation of the

:s right to a jury trial, and that
-~~s:anding
~roof

~eaning
~e

of the rcle of the jury and

in jury cases.

or significance

t~erefore

t~e

had no

State's burden

Finally, appellant avers that the
-9-
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trial judge failed to explain to him the full significance
his right to trial by jury at the trial its elf.

o:

However, at

the hearing Mr. Kennedy was unable to state what more

~

should have been told at or before trial concerning this rigr::
(T. 42, 45, 49).
In the lower court's dee is ion denying appellant's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Judge Durham determined
that appellant did not meet his burden of showing that his
waiver of trial by jury was involuntary or unknowing.
'.'!oreover, Judge Durham ruled that appellant was not denied h;,
right to the effective assistance of counsel because counsel
was experienced and discussed all material tactical decisions
with appellant (R. 34).
In order to sustain his appeal from a denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, appellant has the burder
of proving the grounds on which he relies for his release by
evidence which is clear and convincing.
18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967).

McGuffey v. Turner,

There is a presumption

t:hat the lower court did not commit error in its ruling.
v. Sheriff of Clark County, Nev., 455 P.2d 623 (1969).

Lee
The

unsupported statements of a petitioner in a habeas corpus
proceeding do not meet the requirements of proof, Corn v ·
Page, Old.

Cir., 428 P.2d 343 (1967), particularly because as

this Court held in Maxwell v. Turner,
287

20 Utah 2d 163, 435 p,J;

(1967), recognition is given to the prerogative and the

advantaged position of the trial court and his finrlings and
judgment are given a presumption of correctness.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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.l\S

:etermined in Maxwell, supra, the duty of this Court in
:onsidering an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus
15

to survey the evidence in the light most favorable to the

0wer court's findings and judgment, which are not upset if
is any substantial support for them in the evidence.

:~re

see also Price v. Turner, Utah, 502 P.2d 121 (1972); Velasquez
:. '.'ratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 443 p, 2d 1020 ( 1968); Brown v.
21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968).

~·

Evidence presented by a habeas corpus petitioner
n°ej not be
:~:i'.,Jel~ed

o:oE it

taken as fact,

and the trial court is not

to oelieve such evidence where there is anything
,,;h~ch

11ould reasonably justify refusal to accept it

'' tr.e facts, and this includes the self-interest of the

,_::-,sss,
~~e~

,"\2.so,

this Co_irt has held that where an accused has

represented by a rr,er;iber of the bar in good standing, and

'''sofar as the record discloses,

in a diligent and capable manner,

·-:~:esEnted

,,,j,,-:

the accused has been
it is fair to

that the attorney fulfilled his duties in other

~csCJe:ts

and advised tl:e accused concerning his rights.

_-_.,_,,_,s_~_,_,___C:-'u-''r=-"-·-e_r,

24 :_:-:ah 2d -i39,

4-;-3 P.2d 901 (1970).

In light of the foregoing standards, it is apparent
,. scpel!ant has not sustained his burden of proving that he
~ ~:~

~a~:e

~i3!.

an intelligent and l:nowing waiver of his right to
Judge Durharr found that appellant was not denied
_ 1 1 _
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the effective assistance of counsel, but was r e presented by
competent, experienced counsel who discussed all tactical
decisions with appellant.

Appellant himself has tacitly

acknowledged that he was given effective assistance of counse:
by Mr. Warner because, in the instant matter, by not raising
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, he
has waived it.

It is therefore fair to assume that Mr. warner

advised appellant of his right to a jury trial, particularly
in light of the record in the instant case.
There is nothing in the record, save appellant's
self-interested testimony,

to show that Mr. Warner did not

explain to appellant the meaning and significance of the ng'.'.
to a jury trial before Mr. Warner appeared before Judge
Sorenson on the Motion to Sever on November 21, 1979.

It is

merely appellant's self-interested assertion that he had not
discussed and approved of the waiver of a jury trial with Mr.
Warner before Mr. Warner indicated to Judge Sorenson that
appellant was willing to waive a jury trial.

Appellant also

omits stating that Mr. Warner informed him on November 24,
2-979,

several days before trial,

that the decision to 1,aive

jury trial was only tentative, and that if appellant 1;ished t:
change his mind, Mr. Warner would call Judge Sorenson and hai·e
a jury trial set.

-12-
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It is well settled in criminal law that the
credibility of witnesses and the weight and consideration to
be given to
0:

their testimony are within the exclusive province

tr.e trier of facts.

63 (1975);

Hall v. State, Nev., 513 P.2d 1244 (1975).

4:Jcitionally,
~

t~e

in the instant matter, the findings and judgment

trial court are presumed correct, particularly because

2 -:dence

t::i

Cowdill v. State, Okl. Cir. 532 P.2d

presented by a habeas corpus petitioner does not need

oe taken as fact where such evidence is inherently self-

i~,terested,

and where, as in the instant matter, there is

SJco':ant i d support for Judge Durham's decision in the
e·:i.5'°:-i:::e adduced at the hearing.

Appellant has not met his

OJ::'ie;; o::: proving that his waiver of a jury trial was
ii·;')~Jnta:-y

or unknm·;ing; and,

in li9ht of the substantial

e--ije:-ice on the record supporting Judge Durham's decision
der.Ji:-ig appellant's petition (see Respondent's Statement of
0

oc:3 at:J':e),

this Court '11Ust sustain that decision.

POINT I I
IT IS NOT

REQ~IRED

THAT

T~E

TRI\L JUDGE

·.:;..:;£ It\QL.I?.': SN THE RECORD OF .A!\

ACCl'SSD' s rz::o1:ING i",t'JD INTELLIGE'JT \iAIVER
OF HIS RIGH~ TO A JURY TRIAL OR THAT THE
TRIAL CO~RT HAVE A ~RITTEN WAIVER OF THAT
RIGHT.
-13-
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Appellant suggests that it was necessary for ~e
trial judge to advise him of the full significance of his
right to a jury trial or have a written waiver from appellant
of the right to a jury trial.

In her memorandum decision

denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
Judge Durham rejected this contention:
Defendant contends that the Court should
have orally advised him about the
significance of his right to a jury trial
and should have required him to execute a
written waiver after responding to
questions about his understanding of the
right and the waiver.
Although such
procedures are clearly desirable and
useful, they do not appear to be
constitutionally required.
In this case defendant was specifically
questioned as to his desire to waive the
jury; he had an opportunity to tell the
court directly if he objected to the
waiver or was uncertain about any part of
it.
He personally assented to the
waiver, and has not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
waiver was unknowing or involuntary.
It
is significant in that regard that he
raised no point vis a vis the jury trial
waiver in the appeal of his conviction
undertaken after trial (R. 34, 35).
This Court,

in several cases, has held that there

valid waiver by a defendant of the rig~t to a JUry tri 3:
even where the defendant himself did not state that he waivec
the right.

In State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772

( 1969), this Court found that it was enough that counsel
-14-
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request that the case be tried without a jury, if that request
,..·as rr.aoe in open court with the defendant standing by
c0u~sel's

side, stating:
This meets requirement of § 77-27-2,
u.c.A., 1953, which provides that the
waiver of a jury must "be made in open
court and entered in the minuted," and
the record indicates with sufficient
clarity that the right was waived •
The matter of trial tactics is not the
concern of the court, but of the
defendant and his counsel.

~cl

F.Ld 772, 776.

.oi

F.2d 92-;- ( 1945).

See also Barlow v. Young, 108 Utah 523,

~ppellant

ccntends that the federal rules, case

":,,., 2nd Lie new Utah Fules of Criminal Procedure require that

c:.s trc.al court must
r

ma~e

:re accused is knowi'.1g,

~~c:e~ure,

inc;uiry to ascertain 1·1hether waiver
intelligent, and voluntary.

Such a

t,u,,,ever, as Judge Durham determined, is not

cJr.c:tit•Jtionally required.
·.·tar. Code _;;r.:1otated,

§

77-35-17(c)

(1981 Supp.)

>'2.s ·.:ith 1·:aiver by ar. accused of a jury trial and provides

:: c::

:11 felony cases stall be tried
~nless t~e
ope~ court

b~
de~endant waives a jury
~~th the approval of the

and the consent of the prosecution .

.

~tJte

e·e~~1:1e

a jury
in
court

does not require that the trial court make inquiry
whether tte defendant's waiver is knowing,

-15-
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Even under the more restrictive Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which require that the defendant sign a
written waiver of the right to a jury trial

(Rule 23), it has

often been held that it is not necessary for the judge

~

interrogate the defendant in order to obtain a val id waiver,
Estrada v. United States, 957 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1972).
The United States Supreme Court, in Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), determined that a trial
court has the power to try a criminal case without a jury
where the accused waives a jury trial; and that the waiver ot
a jury is ef feet i ve where the re is the sa net ion of the court,
the consent of the government counsel, and the express and
intelligent consent of the defendant.

The Supreme Court, in

Patton, established no requirement that the judge make inquire
to determine that the accused's waiver of jury trial is
knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary.
In Johnson v.

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458

(1938), the

Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
cenying the petition,

The district court, in

believed that the petitioner 11as

deprived in the trial court of his constitutional right ~
counsel; but nevertheless held that the proceedings deprivina
the petitioner of his right to counsel were insufficient to
make the trial void and

justify its annulment in a habeas

-16-
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cor?us proceeding.

The district court determined that such

proceedings constituted trial errors or irregularities which
could only be corrected on appeal.

In its decision, the

supreme Court determined that a habeas corpus petitioner bears
a r,eavy burden of proof to convince the court hearing his
that he did not properly waive such a fundamental

~ti~ion

cor.stitutional right:
It must be remembered, however, that
a judgment cannot be lightly set aside by
collateral attack, even on habeas corpus.
When collaterally attacked, the judgment
of a court carries with it a presumption
of regularity. Where a defendant,
without counsel, acquiesces in a trial
resulting in his conviction and later
seeks release by the extraordinary remedy
of habeas corpus, the burden of proof
rests upon r.im to establish that he did
not completely and intelligently waive
his constitutional right to assistance of
counsel.
. If petitioner fails to
sustain this burden, he is not entitled
to the writ (304 U.S. at 468, 469).
kS noted in Point I above, appellant, having failed
::

·~·.cc:

'.~isl

his heavy burden of proof, may not now allege that the

court errec1 in net making inquiry to determine whether
-~~ver

-:if

~_1;:y

Nor

~ay

triel 1.•as kno11in(J, intelligent, and
apfellant rely on his inherently self-

-·.rc::-cstec c:estimony on this appeal to establish that his
:·:c::standing of the role of ti1e jury was limited and that
::·c:·=~:ne

:-,1s waiver of jury trial was somewhat less than
-17-
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1

knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary, particularly where

substantial, credible evidence was adduced showing that
appellant did indeed knowingly and intelligently waive a jury
trial.
The cases relied on by appellant do not, as

~

alleges, require either a writing to waive the accused's rigr::
to a jury trial or an inquiry of the accused by the trial
judge to determine that the waiver by the accused is

knowi~

and intelligent.
In State v. Christean, Utah, 533 P.2d 872 (19751,
the defendant contended that he did not knowingly waive his
right to a jury trial because,

having been charged with a

capital offense and thereby being entitled to a twelve-man
jury, he was erroneously asked by the trial court whether he
understood that he would have to be found guilty by the
unanimous verdict of eight jurors.

This Court held that since

the defendant had been thoroughly examined by defense counsel
as to whether he (defendant) understood the consequences of
waiving a trial by jury and had waived this right prior to the
erroneous question by the trial court, he could not allege
that his waiver was unknowing.

In Christean, there was no

mention by this Court that the trial court is required to
independently inquire into a defendant's knowing and
intelligent waiver of a jury trial.

-18-
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In Hayes v. State, Okl. Cir., 541 P.2d 210 (1975),
the court discussed how one accused of a crime may effectuate
a valid waiver of trial by jury, suggesting that the better
practice is for the accused to waive trial by jury personally

and ir, open court either orally or in writing, and at that

:une for the trial judge to make inquiry of the accused to
ass·Jre in the judge's rr.ind that the waiver is expressly and
intelligently made.

Tte court, however, did not require such

a.-i ir.quiry by the trial judge, and suggested that an accused's
r~q~,t

_s

to trial by jury may also be waived either when he and
are present in open court and the accused stands

c::i~msel

:o;· o.r.d allo\:s counsel to waive jury trial in his behalf, or
,:".e1 counsel

for an accused, outside the accused's presence,

·«1ai·es t''e accused's right to trial by jury, unless the
a:cJsed presents evider.ce to show that he did not ratify the
""ai .. er in any manner.
K}Jpellant's attempt to rely on the federal cases of
:icCart~.y

v.

United States, 394

u.s.

549 (1969), and Heiden v.

·:,,i:t:d States, 353 F. 2ci 53 (9th Cir. 1965) is also misplaced.
~ 0~

cast:s deal with

)r::•ej~re,
0 :c 2

FJ~e

11 of the Federal Rules of

Cri~inal

\·:hich recuires specifically that the court :nay not

'.='- a ouilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere without

=~2r~s~i""lc

the defendar.: personally and determining that the

::ca is ~ad'= vcluntaril:· h'ith understanding of the nature of
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the charge and the consequences of the plea.
requirement that a trial judge,

There is no

in allowing a defendant ~

waive his right to a jury trial,

inquire on the record as tc

the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver.

In

addition, respondent submits that there was much evidence
adduced at the hearing on appellant's petition to show

th~

appellant did indeed knowingly and voluntarily waive his

a~

to a jury trial.
There is no constitutional mandate that an accusec
execute a written waiver of his right to trial by jury oc

t~

the trial court make inquiry on the record of an accused
regarding his knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury tnal.
Appellant therefore may not validly contend, as he attempts t:
do in his Point V, that the transcript and record of his
habeas corpus hearing do not establish that his waiver of jur:
trial was not knowing and voluntary.

Appellant

~tated

on the

record that he waived his right to a jury trial, and there'''°
reasonable adherence to the federal mdndates regarding waiver
of the right to a jury trial in the trial and subsequent
hearing on appellant's petition.

CONCLUSION
Appellant has not ;net his burden of showing that
his waiver of trial by jury was involuntary or unknowing.
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;jr·;eying the record

in the light most favorable to the

:indings and judgment of the lower court, there is substantial
e·:dence to support the judgment.

Appellant has not, simply

his self-interested testimony and assertions, shown

t~rcugh

thct he is entitled to a reversal of the judgment.

There is

no constitutional requirement that the appellant's waiver of
:!:'i:il by =ury be written or that the trial court make inquiry
record as to his kno11ing and intelligent waiver

0 ,. :~.e

:".ece'.lf.

In light of the foregoing facts, case law, and

s: 2 t~:es,

respondent prays that this Court affirm the decision

DATED this 28th day of October, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,

~~~-o)W
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
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